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This paper provides further empirical evidence on the relationship between taxes and financial 
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is based on panel data for Italian companies. In the period 1998-2006 the Italian corporate 
income tax has been reformed several times. In particular the tax deductibility of write-offs of 
equity investment was repealed in 2004. The paper exploits the ensuing high cross-sectional 
and times series variation in the marginal tax rate to identify tax effects. The econometric 
analysis delivers strong evidence that taxes affect the probability of write-offs. In contrast 
there is no evidence that taxes affect the magnitude of the write-offs. The paper also tests for 
the existence of a trade-off between tax minimization and non tax costs such as financial 
reporting costs and agency costs. Surprisingly, the evidence of such trade-off is rather weak. 
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This paper examines the factors that affect both the accounting decision to write-off 
equity investments and the magnitude of such write-offs
1, in a framework characterised 
by the alignment between financial report and tax return. The literature has long 
recognized that asset write-offs differ from most financial statement informations 
because of greater discretion as to their magnitude and timing (Elliot and Shaw, 1988) 
and has provided consistent evidence of strategic use of asset write-offs to manipulate 
financial statements. Quite surprisingly, the same literature have rather neglected the 
role of taxes in write-off decisions. To the extent that write-offs are tax deductible, they 
can be used to reduce the tax burden of a firm. It is therefore interesting to understand to 
which extent taxes affect the discretionary choice to report a write-off and the decision 
on its magnitude and to verify whether there is a trade-off between tax minimization and 
other organizational goals. Answers to these questions may contribute to better 
understand the coordination of taxes and other factors in business decisions 
(Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). 
Equity investment is a natural candidate to investigate the role of taxes in write-off 
decisions. In the case of a depreciable asset a write-off brings about a temporary 
reduction in taxable income, as it reduces future depreciation allowances. The effective 
tax burden, measured by the present value of present and future taxes, is only reduced 
by the higher discount of future tax payments. In contrast, an investment write-off 
entails a permanent reduction in taxable income: the incentive to manipulate impairment 
reporting to decrease the tax burden is therefore stronger. 
The empirical analysis is based on panel data for Italian companies in the period 1998-
2006. There are two main reasons for this choice. The first one is that during this period 
the Italian corporate income tax has been reformed several times. The paper exploits the 
ensuing variation in statutory tax rate and tax base to generate simulated marginal tax 
rates (MTR) which display considerable cross-sectional and time-series variation using 
the Graham-Shevlin methodology (Shevlin, 1990 and Graham 1996a, 1996b, 1999). 
The second reason which makes the Italian case interesting is that the tax deductibility 
                                                 
1 We use the term “write-off” to refer to recognition of the reduced or zero value of investment. 3 
 
of investment write-offs has been repealed in 2004: this provides an ideal setting for 
testing the effect of taxes on financial reporting. 
The paper contributes to the existing literature in several respects. First, to our best 
knowledge this is the first paper that provides direct evidence of tax-effects in write-offs 
decisions. There are several papers which have investigated the empirical determinants 
of assets’ write-offs but none of them have considered the MTR among the explanatory 
variables. Second, the paper uses the Cragg (1971) methodology to provide separate 
estimates of the impact of tax and non-tax factors on the probability to account a write-
off and on its magnitude once the decision of writing-off the asset has been taken. The 
econometric analysis provides strong evidence that taxes affect the probability of write-
offs. In contrast there is no evidence that taxes affect the magnitude of the write-offs. 
Third, the paper tests for the existence of a trade-off between tax minimization and non 
tax costs such as financial reporting costs and agency costs. Quite surprisingly, the 
evidence of such trade-off is rather weak.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a critical review of 
the relevant literature. Section 3 provides background information briefly describing the 
accounting and tax treatment of investment write-offs in Italy. Section 4 describes the 
calculation of the marginal tax rates. Section 5 discusses the model specification and 
defines the variables used in the analysis whereas section 6 describes the data sources 
and summary statistics. The estimations and the results are discussed in section 7. The 
final section provides some concluding remarks. 
1  Literature review 
There are two lines of research that are relevant for this study. The first one is the 
literature which has investigated the factors affecting the decision to record asset write-
offs.  
The recognition of an asset impairment should be based on the comparison between the 
carrying value and the economic value of the asset. However, as noted by Elliot and 
Shaw (1988) asset write-offs “differ from most financial statement information because 
of greater discretion as to their magnitude and timing.” (p. 92). The discretion inherent 
in the accounting rules, combined with the potentially large size of write-offs, implies 4 
 
that managers could strategically adjust the timing and amount of such write-offs, in 
order to recognize the impairments only when it is advantageous to do so.  
Managerial discretion was substantial in US before the mid-1990s as accounting 
standards provided little authoritative guidance on the accounting for most types of 
asset impairments, other than inventory (Francis et al., 1997). By comparing the 
financial characteristics of each write-offs firm to the average performance of a control 
group of firms in the same industry that did not announce write-offs, Strong and Mayer 
(1987) and Elliot and Show (1988) showed that the typical write-off firm was highly 
leveraged, had a weak total return to shareholders and had experienced a recent change 
in top management. Moreover, the firms taking discretionary write-offs were 
significantly larger than other firms in their industries (in terms of revenues and assets) 
and had experienced deteriorating accounting performance in the write-off year and in 
the years preceding write-offs. Further evidence that the write-off decision is influenced 
by both asset impairment (proxied by poor historical firm performance and declining 
industry trends) and managers’ incentive to manipulate earnings (proxied by the 
occurrence of management changes) is provided by Francis et al. (1997).  
Subsequent studies has shown that asset write-offs may be used strategically even in 
presence of authoritative guidance. Widespread concerns about the frequency and 
magnitude of write-offs led the Financial Accounting Standard Board to adopt in 1995 
SFAS No. 121, which specifies the criteria for determining whether impairment of long-
lived assets has occurred and how much impairment should be recognized. Riedl (2004) 
and Boone and Raman (2007) have analyzed US data after the introduction of SFAS 
No. 21 and both conclude that write-offs are still significantly correlated with proxies 
for opportunistic reporting.  
The international evidence is limited but broadly in line with the findings based on US 
data. Both Cotter et al. (1998) and Loh and Tan (2002) find a positive relation between 
firms accounting write-offs and management changes using data respectively from 
Australia and Singapore.  
The second strand of the literature related to this paper is the empirical research in 
accounting on the coordination of taxes and other factors in business decisions. Papers 
in this field focus on the trade-off between tax minimization and other organizational 
goals. Shakelford and Shevlin (2001) provide a thorough review of this literature by 5 
 
distinguishing between papers that address the interaction of financial reporting and tax 
factors and papers that examine the effects of agency costs on tax minimization. 
Although tax accounting and financial accounting often differ in revenue recognition 
and other important concerns, tax plans often result in reporting lower book income. As 
a consequence tax planning affects financial accounting choices and financial 
accounting considerations affect tax plans. Evidence of the book-tax trade off have been 
provided in several fields such as corporate financing decisions, divestiture method, 
inventory accounting, R&D expenditure decision, compensation policies and pension 
plans (Shakelford and Shevlin, 2001). Research addressing taxes and agency costs is 
much less well developed than the book–tax coordination literature. An issues that have 
received attention in recent years is the link between tax planning and the ownership 
structure. Chen et al. (2010), examines the impact of family ownership and control on 
tax aggressiveness and provide evidence that family firms are less tax aggressive than 
their non-family counterparts.  
Quite surprisingly, both strands of the literature have rather neglected the role of taxes 
in write-offs decisions. To the extent that write-offs are tax deductible, they can be used 
to reduce the tax burden of a firm. The reduction will be temporary, in case of a 
depreciable asset, as the write-off reduces future depreciation allowances. Still, a 
profitable firm may reduce the effective tax burden, measured by the present value of 
present and future taxes, by delaying the tax payments into the future. It is therefore 
interesting to understand to which extent taxes affect the discretionary choice to report a 
write-off and the decision on its magnitude and to verify whether there is trade-off 
between tax minimization and other organizational goals.  
Some evidence of the relevance of taxes is provided by Strong and Mayer (1987). They 
document a significant negative relationship between write-offs and the increase in the 
amount of tax loss carry-forwards with respect to previous year. As the increase in loss 
carry-forwards may be seen as a proxy for a low effective marginal tax rate the finding 
suggests that discretionary write-offs  may be tax motivated: firms find advantageous to 
increase write-offs of depreciable assets when the marginal tax rate is high in order to 
delay the tax on income.  
Garrod et al. (2008) argue that tax minimization is a relevant factor in explaining the 
choice and the magnitude of asset write-offs based on their cross-section analysis of a 6 
 
large sample of Slovenian small private companies (SPCs). They find that more 
profitable companies are more likely to write-off and the write-off magnitude is greater. 
Assuming that in SPCs there are no agency issues between owners and managers and 
that owners-managers of SPCs are exposed to pure incentives to rationally minimize the 
present value of present and future tax payments, Garrod et al. (2008) interpret their 
finding as the evidence that write-offs are used as a tax-reducing accounting practice.  
A common weakness of these two papers is that they rely on  proxies for firms’ tax 
status which measure the marginal tax rate with error and that may be correlated with 
other variables which affect write-offs. Accordingly, as suggested by Shakelford and 
Shevlin (2001), caution must be exercised in interpreting results. This point is clearly 
illustrated by the fact that both papers uses losses as a control variable but they provide 
a different interpretation for the estimated coefficients. As mentioned before, Strong and 
Mayer (1987) find a negative association between losses (namely an increase in loss 
carry-forward) and write-offs and interpret it as the proof that write-offs are lower when 
the effective tax rate is lower. Garrod et al. (2008) find a positive association between 
the probability and the magnitude of write-offs and losses and interpret it as evidence 
that write-offs reflect in part actual asset impairment.  
This paper try to overcome this limitation by calculating firm specific MTRs using the 
Graham-Shevlin methodology (Shevlin, 1990 and Graham 1996a, 1996b, 1999). The 
panel dimension of data, the high frequency of tax reforms implemented in the sample 
period and the highly non-linear structure of the Italian corporate income tax bring 
about considerable cross-sectional and time-series variation in the estimated MTRs 
which allow to clearly identify tax effects.  
2  Institutional background 
2.1  Accounting for write-offs of equity investments 
The Italian Civil Code (art. 2426) establishes that if managers believe that a permanent 
decline in equity investments has occurred, at the end of the fiscal year equity 
investments have to be accounted at this lower value, with a write-off in the investment 
valuation. The write-off is based on management’s judgment that the equity investments 
have experienced a permanent reduction in value. The write-off has to be accounted as a 7 
 
loss on investments in the “value adjustments to financial assets” section of the income 
statement. The Italian accounting rules for investment write-off have been unchanged 
from 1998 to 2006. 
The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS)
2, from 2005 
onwards, doesn’t eliminate the discretion in the decision to account investment write-
offs. In fact, the IAS39 (the International Accounting Standard which regards financial 
instruments: recognition and measurement) establishes that an entity shall assess at each 
reporting date whether there is objective evidence that a financial asset is impaired as a 
result of one or more events that occurred after the initial recognition of the asset.  
If impairment is indicated, the amount is calculated by reference to IAS 36 (Impairment 
of Assets). 
2.2  Tax treatment of equity investment write-offs in Italy before and after the 
2004 Tax Reform 
Up to 2003 Italian companies were subject to the corporate income tax called IRPEG 
(Imposta sul reddito delle persone giuridiche). The base for IRPEG was accounting 
income (as deﬁned under the civil code) subject to some adjustments. From 1998 to 
2000 tax rate on IRPEG was stable at 37%; it has been reduced to 36% in 2001 and to 
34% in 2003. Companies with negative taxable income were allowed to carry forward  
losses to offset the taxable income up to the following 5 years. Current-year losses 
could be added to any unused losses from previous years. No tax-loss carry-backs 
existed under IRPEG.  
In 1997, in order to reduce the tax cost of equity, the corporate tax regime was 
amended. Proﬁts were split into two components. One component was categorized as 
                                                 
2 The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards was required for all companies listed in 
regulated European markets by the European Union, with the issuing of Commission Regulation n. 
1606/2002, has required . The IAS/IFRS consist of a set of international accounting principles, the 
adoption of which aims at establishing clear rules within the European Union to draw up comparable and 
transparent annual  reports  and  financial  statements.  Their  adoption  represents  an  essential  element  
to obtain an integrated, competitive and attractive European capital market, which has impelled the 
European Commission to introduce this set of uniform accounting standards for listed EU companies. 
Moreover, the Italian Parliament established that for the financial year 2005 listed companies, financial 
institutions, banks and other regulated financial companies could choose to adopt IAS/IFRS or not, in 
drawing up separate financial statement; otherwise, starting from 2006 those companies should have been 
forced to assume the international accounting standards, in drawing up separate financial statement. 
Starting from 2005 for the other companies
2 it is optional to adopt IAS/IFRS or not. 8 
 
“ordinary income”, the opportunity cost of new equity ﬁnancing, and taxed at a rate of 
19%. “Ordinary income” was computed by multiplying the interest rate on long-term 
government bonds (plus a measure of the equity risk premium) times the value of new 
share issues and retained earnings. Another element of the tax base was the “extra 
normal proﬁt” measured as the difference between total proﬁt and “ordinary income”. 
This second component was taxed at the IRPEG tax rate. It was also established that the 
average tax rate had to be higher than 27%
3 and that, if the IRPEG tax base was smaller 
than the “ordinary income”, the difference between “ordinary income” and IRPEG tax 
base could be carried forward and used to calculate IRPEG in the following years (up to 
5 years). Despite this new method of taxation was commonly named DIT (Dual Income 
Tax) it was different from the dual income taxation implemented in the Nordic 
Countries and more similar to the ACE scheme. 
Under the IPREG regime investment write-off were fully deductible from the tax base. 
In order to limit avoidance strategies, the law requires that, in the presence of equity 
investments evaluated using the equity method, the deductible write-offs cannot exceed 
the impairment evaluated using the cost method (comma 1-ter art. 66 TUIR). Further 
anti-avoidance provisions, for the write-offs of equity investments accounted using the 
cost method, were introduced in 2002, with the legislative decree n.209. In particular 
this decree established the write-offs should be calculated with reference to the 
reduction in the equity value of the investee company net of distribution of retained 
earnings, non-deductible goodwill amortizations and non deductible provisions. 
In 2003 the Government implemented a new tax reform, which came into force in 2004. 
The corporate income tax was renamed IRES (Imposta sul Reddito delle Società). The 
reform established the reduction of the statutory tax rate from 36% to 33% and repealed 
the DIT. Moreover the reform introduced the participation exemption rule, which 
provides the exemption from the corporate tax base of capital gains arising from the 
disposition of corporate shares and investments in other companies. In order to qualify 
for the exemption of capital gains, four requirements must be met
4: the stocks should be 
                                                 
3 The limit according to which the average tax rate had to be higher than 27% was abolished in 2001; but 
in 2002 a new limit was introduced, according to which the average tax rate had to be higher than 30%. 
4 We consider the value of equity investments accounted in the financial assets’ section, which satisfy the 
four requirements for the participation exemption. 9 
 
held without interruption for a minimum period of time (holding period)
5 and should to 
be booked as a long-term asset in shareholder’s financial statement (booking 
requirement); the company whose stocks were sold should actively run a business 
(active business requirement) and (if it is located in a foreign country) it should not be 
resident in a low tax jurisdiction included in the “black list”. Accordingly, it was 
established the non-deductibility of write-offs for the equity investments which would 
have benefited from the tax exemption of capital gains. 
3  The marginal tax rate 
The reduction of tax liabilities, due to a marginal increase in deductible write-offs of 
equity investments, is measured by the MTR. This is deﬁned as the present value of 
current and expected future taxes paid on an additional unit of income earned today. If a 
ﬁrm has positive taxable income the MTR is equal to the statutory tax rate. Otherwise, if 
a ﬁrm has no taxable income today, an additional unit of income reduces the losses that 
can be carried forward and used to offset taxable income in future years. In this case the 
MTR is equal to the discounted value of the taxes paid on the marginal unit of income 
in the ﬁrst year when the ﬁrm is expected to have positive taxable income. The 
computation of the MTR requires two sets of information. The ﬁrst one regards the 
corporate taxation rules (in particular the level of statutory tax rate and the tax code 
treatment of net operating losses). The second is managers’ expectations on future 
income ﬂows. 
Tax provisioning governing Italian companies between 1998 and 2003 entail that in 
order to calculate the MTR we must distinguish three different cases: 
a)  in year t IRPEG ”Extra normal proﬁts” are positive and the average tax rate is 
higher than 27%
6. An additional unit of income pays the comprehensive tax rate.  
Hence, in this case, the MTR is equal to: 
IRPEG MTR τ =  
                                                 
5 When enacted, the minimum holding period requirement was twelve months. Later on, it was increased 
to eighteen months. 
6 As already pointed out in footnote 3, in 2001 the minimum level requirement for average tax rate (at 
least 27%) was abolished, so it was sufficient that IRPEG ”Extra normal proﬁts” were positive to be in 
the case “a”; in 2002 it was introduced a new minimum level requirement for average tax rate (at least 
30%), so it was necessary that IRPEG ”Extra normal proﬁts” were positive and the average tax rate was 
higher than 30% to be in the case “a”. 10 
 
where   IRPEG τ  represents the statutory IRPEG tax rate. 
b)  in year t the IRPEG tax base is smaller than “Ordinary income” or the average 
tax rate is lower than 27%
7. An additional unit of income produces two changes 
in the company’s tax position. First, it increases the tax liabilities by the 
minimum tax rate of 27%. Second, it reduces the “Ordinary income” that can be 
carried forward and used to calculate IRPEG in the following years. If IRPEG 
taxable income in year  1 + t  is smaller than “Ordinary income”, the ﬁrm next 
applies the “Ordinary income” in excess to taxable income in year  2 + t  and so 
on.  Assume that  n t +  is the ﬁrst year when the IRPEG ”Extra normal proﬁts” 
are positive.  If  5 > n  a reduction in the ”Ordinary income” carry-forward in 
year t has no consequences on the IRPEG that the company will pay in future 
years. In this case the MTR is therefore equal to the minimum tax rate of 27%. 
On the other hand, if  5 < n , a unit increase in income of year t translates into a 
unit decrease in the IRPEG paid in year  n t + . In this case the MTR is equal to 
the minimum tax rate of 27% plus the discounted value of the IRPEG saved in 
year  n t + . 
Summarizing: 











τ  if  5 < n  
where   IRPEG
m τ  represents the IRPEG minimum tax rate. 
c)  In year t the IRPEG tax base is negative. In this case the MTR is equal to the 
discounted
8 value of the additional IRPEG that will be: 
0 = MTR  if  5 > n  
n r T MTR
− + × = ) 1 ( i f   5 < n  
where 
m
IRPEG T τ =  or  IRPEG τ  depending on the value of “Ordinary income”   
in year n.  
                                                 
7   See footnote 3. 
8 Taxed paid from the year  1 + t  to the year  5 + t  are discounted using the average yield of a set of 
Government and listed bonds. We received the data from Mediobanca.  11 
 
Since  2004, due to the abolition of the so-called “Dual income taxation” we have only 
two different scenarios: 
a)  In year t the IRES tax bases is positive. An additional unit of income pays the 
comprehensive tax rate. Hence, in this case, the MTR is equal to: 
IRES MTR τ =  
where  IRES τ  represents the statutory IRES tax rates. 
b)  In year t the IRES tax bases is negative. The MTR is equal to the discounted 
value of the additional IRPEG that will be paid in year  n t + : 
0 = MTR  if  5 > n  
n
IRES r MTR
− + × = ) 1 ( τ  if  5 < n  
3.1  Simulating managers’ expectations and marginal tax rates 
The “true” marginal tax rate cannot be computed since it requires knowledge of 
managers’ expectations on future income ﬂows.  We proxy managers’ expectations 
using the method proposed by Shevlin (1990) based on the assumption that pre-tax 
income follows a pseudo-random walk with drift: 
it i it Y ε μ + = Δ  
where  it Y Δ  is the ﬁrst difference in pre-tax income of company i in year t,  i μ  is the 
sample mean of  it Y Δ  and  it ε  is a normally distributed random variable with mean zero 
and variance equal to that of  it Y Δ  over the years 1998-2006. 
When, in a given year, the IRPEG (IRES since 2004) tax base is negative, or when the 
IRPEG tax base is smaller than ”Ordinary income” or the average tax rate is lower than 
27%
9 we run 100 simulations of income in the following 5 years using a different 
random normal realization of  it ε  for each year. For each simulation we calculate first 
the present value of taxes to be paid taking into account loss carry-forward provisions
10.  
Then we add a unit of income in the reference year and recalculate the present value of 
the tax bill. By taking the differences between these two present values, 100 simulations 
                                                 
9 In the period 1998-2000 we run simulations if the average tax rate is lower than 27%; instead, in 2002 
and 2003 we run simulations if the average tax rate is lower than 30%. For more details see footnote 5. 
10 In calculating the present value of taxes to be paid, we suppose a myopic behavior by companies which 
conjecture that in the following five years the statutory tax rate will be equal to that of the current year. 12 
 
of the marginal tax rate are obtained. We use their average as the proxy for the ”true” 
marginal tax rate. This procedure is adopted for each company in the sample.  
Graham (1996b) argues that this proxy is the best predictor of the marginal tax rate 
calculated on actual income realizations. This claim has been recently questioned by 
Blouin et al (2010).
11 They show that the Shevlin/Graham MTR forecasting approach 
produces inaccurate estimates of mean future income (too high when current income is 
high and too low when current income is low) and underestimates the future volatility 
of income for all income groups. The reasons are twofold. First, income is better 
described by a mean-reverting process rather than a random-walk, due to transitory 
components in accounting income, and economic factors such as entry and exit. Second, 
when a firm’s assets and income grow over time, the historical volatility measured since 
inception is likely to substantially under-state the future volatility. However, in our 
analysis the bias in the MTR calculated according to the Shevlin/Graham methodology 
is limited by two factors. First, our sample covers a significantly shorter period than the 
one analysed by Blouin et al.(2010) (27 years from 1980 to 2007): this should reduce 
the under-estimation of income volatility for growing firms. Second, loss-carryforward 
is limited to five years in Italy compared to the twenty-two years in US. The shorter 
forecasting horizon should reduce the error in the simulated MTR. 
Besides the Shevlin/Graham proxy (which we refer to as MTR), we have considered an 
additional measure for the marginal tax rate. This alternative variable  (which we will 
refer to as TID) assumes that managers, when computing the relevant marginal tax rate 
for investment decisions, set it equal to the top statutory tax rate when the company has 
a positive value of income before taxes and before investment write-offs and equal to 
zero otherwise. By assuming a sort of myopic behaviour we are actually reducing 
across-company variability when compared to MTR. 
4  Non tax motives of write-offs 
Tax minimization is not the only factor which drives discretionary write-offs of equity 
investments. On the one hand, managers may record write-offs of equity investments to 
account for poorer participated firm's performances. On the other hand, tax motivated 
                                                 
11 We would like to thank Reinald Koch for bringing this paper to our attention. 13 
 
write-offs of equity investments may bring about several non tax costs. We insert in our 
model  several variables to control for non tax effects.  
4.1  Impairment motive 
Firms may account write-offs of equity investments in presence of a complete or partial 
downward revaluation of an investee company. Unfortunately we do not have data on 
the results recorded every year by the investee companies. Therefore we use several 
variables to proxy for the investee company’s performances, some of them reflect the 
trend of the performance of the investor company. We suppose, in fact, that firms will 
be more likely to invest in the equity of companies which are in the same industrial  
sector. 
 
Stock Market Trend 
We also include a proxy for the trend of the stock market calculated for different 












We expect that firms in sectors characterized by a decreasing trend of stock market are 
more likely to account write-offs of equity investments. 
Performance of the firm’s industry 
We also add two variables to proxy for the performance of the investor firm's industry. 
We compute the average sales growth  ) _ ( st GRO IND  and the log of GDP  ) ( st LGDP  in 
each industrial sector of the investor company (e.g. Francis, Hanna and Vincent, 1996).  
We predict that firms in decreasing industries will be more likely to account write-offs 
of equity investments (since we suppose that the investor and the investee company are 
in the same industry sector and the write-offs could reflect an impairment of the 
performance of the investee companies) than firms in growing ones. 
However, both the variables could be considered proxies as well as for impairment 
motive also for financial reporting costs. In the last case, we expect to find a positive 
                                                 
12 To calculate the value of  ) ( st AZIO  we use the data diffused by BORSA ITALIANA “Indici MIB 
Storici Settoriali, base 30.12.1994=1000”. 14 
 
link between the variables  st GRO IND _ a n d   st LGDP and the decision to account 
investment write-offs, since for firms in declining industries it will be very important to 
record a better performance, in order to reduce the financial reporting costs. 
4.2  Financial reporting costs 
The trade-off theory implies that firms balance the benefits of write-offs with the 
financial reporting costs. Financial reporting costs are related to reporting lower income 
and are a direct consequence of tax-minimization strategies. Many financial agreements 
with stakeholders (for example with creditors, lenders or customers) use accounting 
numbers to specify the terms of trade, influencing manager’s willingness to report lower 
income. Thus, the choice to account write-offs of equity investments involve weighing 
the tax incentive to lower taxable income against the financial reporting incentives to 
increase book income, making better the external stakeholders' perception of the 
company. In this section we will introduce several variables to analyze the importance 
of the external perception of the company. 
Our assumption is that more indebted companies, less liquid companies, companies 
with smaller profitability and companies with a higher probability of bankruptcy are 
exposed to higher controls by stakeholders and will prefer to record a better 
performance, in order to not increase the costs of borrowing, rather than to minimize 
taxes. 
Debt to Equity Ratio 
We expect that very indebted companies will be less likely to accounting write-offs of 
equity investments, because they should prefer to record a better performance, in order 
to obtain a better creditor's perception and not to increase the costs of debt, even at the 
cost of not minimizing the fiscal imposition (e.g., Bontempi et al., 2004). For this 









In addition we control for  it LEVW , which is a value of the debt to equity ratio weighted 









⋅ =   
This variable should capture the effect of higher creditor control on write-offs when 
equity investments are a higher share of total assets. 
 
Profitability 
For very profitable companies the probability to need loans decreases and the external 
consideration becomes less important; so it is possible to act to minimize current tax 
liabilities. As a consequence we expect that very profitable companies use write-offs to 
reduce taxable profits more than less profitable ones. We modify the profitability used 











We expect that firms will be less likely to account write-offs of equity investments if  
the expected costs of financial distress are high, in order to obtain a better firm's 
external perception. A variable linked to expected distress costs is Altman's (1968) Z-
score. The Z-score predicts the probability of bankruptcy within two years: the lower 
the value of  it ZSC , the higher the probability of bankruptcy. 
We modify the Z-Score used by MacKie-Mason (1990), Graham, Lemmon, and 
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In addition we insert  it ZSCW , which is equal to  it ZSC  weighted according to the ratio 
equity Investments/Total Assets: 
it
it









Liquidity can affect the cost of borrowing. With regard to liquidity, the most basic 
assumption is that illiquid firms face high ex ante borrowing costs. Then we expect that 
illiquid firms are less likely to accounting write-offs of equity investments than liquid 
ones, in order to account higher income and to not increase further the costs of 
borrowing. 
We measure liquidity with the current ratio and with the value of tangible assets in 
respect to total assets (e.g. Graham, 2000), because we assume that tangible assets 
increase company's debt capacity, because these assets are promptly marketable in case 
of short-notice liquidation. 
it
it















Large firms have lower ex ante costs of financial distress, in general because they are 
more diversified. Large firms may also benefit for lower informational costs associated 
with borrowing. Firm size is gauged with the natural log of real sales accounted in the 
year preceding the accounting of write-off (e.g. Francis, Hanna and Vincent, 1996). 
) ln( 1 − = it it Sales SIZE  
We expect larger companies to be more likely to accounting write-offs of equity 
investments than smaller ones. 
4.3  Agency relationships 
In this study we insert a variable to proxy for the ownership structure of the companies 
analyzed. We suppose that the interests of management and the firm’s ownership are not 
always perfectly aligned. Management has the incentive to act in a manner consistent 
with maximizing pre-tax income; whereas, owners are more likely to act in order to 
minimize the fiscal burden.  17 
 
Small private companies 
We suppose that the ownership structure of small private companies leads to no 
significant separation of ownership from management, and that for small private 
companies financial reporting is more likely to be influenced by taxation (according to 
Garrod, Kosi and Valentincic, 2008). 
We insert in our model the dummy variable  i SPC , which assumes value 1 for small 
private companies and value 0 for large and public ones. The criteria that denotes a 
company as “small private company” is defined in terms of total assets, sales revenues 
and number of employees
13 (Official Gazette of Italian Republic, 4/1/2007). 
We expect that small private companies will be more likely to account write-offs of 
equity investments in order to reduce tax burden. 
Participations in foreign companies 
We insert a variable to proxy for the presence of information asymmetry. In particular 
we suppose that the presence of equity investments in foreign firms may influence the 
decision to account discretionary write-offs of equity investments. We expect that firms 
with equity investments in foreign firms will be more likely to account such write-offs, 
because it is more difficult to verify if the investee firm's income has been lower than in 
the previous year. 
We introduce in our model the dummy variable  i PFC , which assigns value 1 to firms 
with foreign equity investments, value zero otherwise. 
5  Data and summary statistics 
The accounting data are gathered from the AIDA database, made by Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing, containing accounting information on more than 200.000 Italian 
firms. 
Our sample is restricted to firms which: 
1.  have balance sheet data in all the years of the period 1997- 2006; 
2.  have at least one participated company; 
3.  are not sector "Agriculture, forestry and fishing". 
                                                 
13 A company is defined small if isn’t a listed firms, the number of employees does not exceed 50 and 
fulfils one of the two following criteria: total assets at the end of fiscal year do not exceed 10 milions of 
euro, sales revenues at the end of fiscal year do not exceed 10 milions of euro. 18 
 
We obtain a balanced panel data set of 5924 companies. Figure 1 shows the trend of 
write-down of equity investments, expressed in percentage of total assets (WOTA ), 
from 1998 to 2006, for the companies in the sample. From 1998 to 2003 we have an 
increasing trend: the value of WOTA  grew from 6.6% to 8.5%, with the only exception 
of 2002, when the value decrease to 7.7%. This reduction is strictly linked to the crisis 
following 11 September 2001. The drop of the Index Stock Market in 2001 may explain 
the reason why the value of WOTA  grew to 8.3%, while the recovery of 2002 explain 
the WOTA  reduction to 7.7%. The peak of WOTA  in 2003 coincides with the reform of 
Italian Fiscal System, which abolished the deductibility of write-offs of equity 
investments starting from 2004 onward (2003 was the last year in which firms could 
benefit from the deductibility of write-offs of equity investments). From 2004 to 2006 
there is a continuing decrease of WOTA , which goes down to 5.4% in 2006. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that in previous years part of write-offs of equity 
investments were motivated by tax-planning.  
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Table I reports summary statistics of all the variables included in the model. The 
dummy variable WO , which indicates if firms recorded write-offs of equity 
investments, has a mean of 0.1488 and a standard deviation of 0.3559. In particular 
3258 firms of our sample have never accounted write-offs of equity investments in the 
years considered, while only 56 firms have recorded write-offs in every single year. 
The marginal tax rate simulated using the Graham’s methodology (MTR )  has a mean 
of 0.3056 and a standard deviation of 0.0972, while the alternative proxy (TID )  has a 
smaller mean (0.2924) and a higher standard deviation (0.1324).  
The difference between TID  and MTR  comes from the different data used to calculate 
themselves. We use the income before taxes and investment write-offs to calculate   
TID , not taking into account the possibility to carry forward losses to offset the taxable 
income. On the contrary, to estimate MTR  we use a measure of taxable income 
calculated using the value of income before taxes and including the possibility to carry 
losses forward. Moreover to calculate TID  we use only the top statutory tax rate, 
instead to estimate MTR  the tax bill is calculated using the entire corporate tax 
schedule. 
Table II summarizes some industry specific facts about write-offs and corporate 
taxation (MTR   and  TID ). For all the three variables, our sample contains full 
information over 5924 firms in 26 different ATECO 2002 sectors.  
About a-half of the firms of our sample is in the ATECO sector “MANIFACTURING 
ACTIVITY” (48,41%), most of which work on “Production of cars and mechanic   
machine” (6,77%), “Production of metal (excluding cars and plant)” (6,18%), “Food 
Industries” (5,72%) and “Textile Industries” (5,28%). 
More than one fourth of the firms is in the ATECO sector “COMMERCE AND 
REPARATIONS” (26,87%). 
The table 2 shows that the minimum value of WOTA  has been recorded by firms in the 
sector “INSTRUCTION” (0.00148%), while the higher one has been recorded by the 
firms in the sector “FINANCIAL ACTIVITY” (0.84%). 
Looking at the marginal tax rate the sector “CIVIL SERVICES” has reached the higher 
value of TID  (35,11%), while very lower is the value of MTR  (26,85). 
On the other hand, the sector with the higher value of MTR  is “WOOD INDUSTRIES” 
(32,80%).  20 
 
All the variables exhibit a reasonable amount of variations across the sample.  
As shown by table 3, the explanatory variables are essentially uncorrelated. The table 4 
shows that there is no correlation between yearly marginal tax rate. 
6  Estimations and results 
In the first step of our analysis we want to investigate if there is a fiscal effect 
influencing the decision of accounting write-offs of equity investments. Using as 
dependent variable WO  (a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for firms which have 
accounted write-offs of equity investments, 0 otherwise) we have a binary choice 
model. The multivariate analysis uses a Probit and a Logit model to estimate the 
importance of variables in explaining the decision to account write-offs of equity 
investments. 
Afterward, in the second step, we use WOTA as dependent variable, where WOTA  is 
equal to the ratio between write-offs of equity investments and total assets of the 
previous year. We use the Cragg’s specification of the Tobitt model to estimate the 
importance of variables in explaining the amount of write-offs of equity investments 
accounted by firms (see Hsiao, 2003). 
6.1  Decision to write-off 
The table 5 summarizes the empirical results obtained estimating a Probit Random 
Effects Model and a Logit Random Effects Model. In order to consider the effects of the 
Italian fiscal reform of 2004 on the decision to account investment write-offs, we split 
the fiscal variable MTR  into two components:  PRE MTR −  (MTR  before fiscal 
reform) and  POST MTR −  (MTR  post reform). In this way it is possible  to investigate 
which are the effects of the fiscal variable on the decision to account write-offs of 
equity investments in a fiscal regime that admits or prohibit the deductibility of such 
write-offs. 
Probit and Logit estimations yield almost the same results in terms of signs and 
significance level. Both the estimates support our hypothesis that the benefit of 
accounting write-offs of equity investments at the margin increases with the firm’s 
marginal tax rate, if the fiscal system allows the deductibility of such write-offs. In fact, 
the variable  PRE MTR −  is statistically significant and affects positively the probability 21 
 
to account write-offs of equity investments. On the contrary, the variable  POST MTR −  
is statistically significant and negatively correlated with WO . This implies that, in 
contrast with our hypothesis, after the Italian fiscal reform, the fiscal variable could 
influence the decision to account write-offs of equity investments. 
It’s important to underline that  POST MTR −  has a negative sign, opposite to 
PRE MTR − . This allow us to assert that after Italian fiscal reform there was a change 
of the effect of fiscal variable in influencing the decision to account write-offs of equity 
investments. 
Among the variables that proxy for the investee company’s performance, the stock 
market trend doesn’t result statistically significant. Both the proxies for the performance 
of the firm’s industry result statistically significant and positively linked to the 
probability to account investment write-offs, indicating that it will be more appropriate 
to consider these variables as proxies for the financial reporting costs rather than for the 
impairment of the investee companies. These results are in line with Francis, Hanna and 
Vincent (1996), which find that firms in industries with increasing trend are more likely 
to take write-offs.  
Among the variables that proxy for the financial reporting costs LEV ,  PROF , CR and 
SIZE  are statistically significant and have the expected signs. 
In particular write-offs are more likely in bigger and more profitable firm. The 
probability of write-offs is lower in higher leveraged companies. 
The variable LEVW  is statistically significant and is positively linked to WO . It shows 
that the positive effect of the ratio Equity Investments/Total Assets on the probability to 
account write-offs of equity investments more than offsets the negative effect of LEV . 
In contrast with our expectations, the variable ZSC  results negatively linked to the 
probability to account write-offs of equity investments. Instead, the Z-score weighted 
according to the ratio Equity Investments/Total Assets is statistically significant and has 
the expected sign. 
The independent variable TA is statistically significant, but, contrary to what we 
expected, it is negatively linked to the probability to account investment write-offs. 22 
 
The variable PFC  results highly statistically significant and has the expected sign, 
confirming our hypothesis that companies with equity investments in foreign firms are 
more likely to account investment write-offs. 
The variable SPC , instead, results not statistically significant underlining that the 
ownership structure of small private companies doesn’t affect the probability to account 
investment write-offs. 
The table 6 summarizes the coefficients and the marginal effects of the yearly MTR . 
The results confirm the presence of a fiscal effect which could influence the decision to 
account investment write-offs. In fact, by one side all the yearly fiscal variable from 
1998 to 2003 are highly statistically significant and are positively linked to WO . On the 
other side  2004 MTR  is not statistically significant and  2005 MTR  and  2006 MTR  are 
both statistically significant and negatively liked to the decision to account write-offs of 
equity investments. 
Additionally it is important to underline that in 2003 we record an high impact of the 
fiscal variable on the write-off decision, probably due to the anticipation of following 
write-offs. In fact, known the impossibility to benefit from the deductibility of   
write-offs of equity investments from 2004 on, companies in 2003 could have decided 
to account an higher value of write-offs, bringing forward to 2003 the write-off which 
had been accounted from 2004 on. 
6.2  Sensitivity and robustness checks 
In the first set of sensitivity analysis, following Graham (1996b), we define an 
alternative version of the marginal tax rate: the taxable income dummy (TID ), which is 
a dichotomous variable based on the sign of current period taxable income before write-
offs. The variable TID  has value equal to the top statutory tax rate for firms with a 
positive income before taxes and before write-offs, value 0 otherwise. Also in this case, 
we split the fiscal variable into  PRE TID −  and  POST TID − , in order to take into 
account the 2004 Italian fiscal reform. 
In the column A of table 7 there are shown the marginal effects estimated using a Probit 
random effects model, which can be directly compared to the results summarized in 
table 5. We find that the parameter estimates, coming from the two models using two 
different variants of marginal tax rate, are not very different. The only one significant 23 
 
difference concerns the fiscal variable after the reform ( POST TID − ), which results not 
statistically significant, in line with our expectations. 
In the second set of sensitivity analysis we restrict our sample in various ways, in order 
to exclude potentially influential outliers from the sample. 
We estimate the model restricting the sample to small private companies (as defined in 
par. 4.3). In line with our expectation, the results (column B of table 7) show that the 
POST MTR −  is not statistically significant for small private companies. The signs and 
the significance level of the other variables are almost the same obtained estimating the 
full sample. 
From table 2 it emerges that in some sectors there are few firms (e.g., “Civil Services” 
and “Instructions”) and that about a-half of the firms of our sample are in the ATECO 
sector “Manufacturing Activity”. Therefore we narrow our analysis respectively to 
industries whit more than 79 firms (removing about 2.000 observations) and to firms in 
the ATECO sector “Manufacturing Activity”. In both the cases we obtain almost the 
same marginal effects estimated as in the original model (the results are summarized in 
column C of table 7 and column D of table 8, respectively). 
It is possible that our empirical findings could be driven by the presence in our sample 
of companies with equity investments in foreign firms, whose income is more difficult 
to verify. 
In column E and F of table 7, we present the results obtained excluding from the sample 
respectively the firms with equity investments in foreign companies and the listed 
companies. In the first case we examine whether the observed relationships between the 
decision to account investment write-offs and corporate tax rate is sensitive to the 
presence of investee foreign firms. In the second case, excluding by our sample the 
listed companies (which are exposed to several controls), we expect to find a stronger 
fiscal effect influencing the write-off decision. The results obtained in both the 
regressions are very similar to those obtained estimating the original model, underlining 
that the fiscal effect doesn’t change in these subsample, contrary as expected. 
6.3  Interaction terms 
We modify our model to capture more evidence that firms trade-off taxes with financial 
reporting costs and agency costs on accounting decision to write-off equity investments. 24 
 
In particular, we include an interaction term between tax and some non-tax costs, which 
is obtained multiplying the variable  PRE MTR −  for the non-tax variables (because we 
assume that there is a trade-off up to 2003).  
A significant coefficient on the interaction term is consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms consider the level of the other costs and trade-off tax and non-tax cost. 
The results, presented in table 9, show that the coefficients on the interaction terms are 
not statistically significant, with the exception of the interaction term between taxes and 
LEV ,  LEVW  and  ZSC . We may conclude that there is no convincing evidence that 
firms trade-off taxes between tax and non-tax costs and benefits. 
6.4  Magnitude of write-offs 
In this section we investigate which are the factors that could influence the magnitude of 
investment write-offs, limiting the analysis to that firms which account such write-offs. 
Before presenting the results of the econometric analysis of write-off decision, some 
methodological issues have to be discussed. The dependent variable, the propensity to 
account investment write-offs, is a doubly truncated random variable, which varies 
between 0 and 1 by definition, therefore frequently takes the value of zero. A generally 
used approach to dealing with the problem of censored samples is the Tobit model. This 
model uses all the information for the explanatory variables, and includes both the 
decision of whether or not to account investment write-offs and the level of such write-
offs in a model (see Lin and Schmidt 1984 for details). In this model the change of the 
expected value of the dependent variable has two components: one effect works by 
changing the conditional mean of the dependent variable and the other by changing the 
probability that an observation will be positive. 
The alternative specification, presented by Cragg (1971), instead, proposes a two stage 
specification, which separates the decision of whether or not to account investment 
write-offs from the decision of how much write-offs to account. The first stage of this 
specification uses the whole set of data and consider the decision to account or not 
investment write-offs. To estimate this stage the Probit model is appropriate. For the 
second stage, only the subset of firms which account investment write-offs is 
considered. A truncated estimation procedure is used because the dependent variable is 
observed only if it is greater than zero.  25 
 
Taking the Tobit as the restricted model and the Cragg as the unrestricted model, the 
Tobit model is rejected at the 99% probability using a  squared Chi− Likelihood ratio 
test. 
The table 10 shows the results for the Cragg model for the propensity to account 
investment write-offs for the sub set of “writing-off” firms. It results that there is an 
important difference between the influence of the fiscal variable on the probability and 
on the propensity to account investment write-offs. In fact, the variable  PRE MTR −  
results positively and significantly linked to the probability to account investment write-
offs, whereas it is not statistically significant for the propensity to account investment 
write-offs for the “writing-off” firms. The fiscal variable after the 2004 Italian fiscal 
reform is statistically significant and is negatively signed, as in the Probit results. 
In addition all the variables which proxy for the impairment motive result not 
statistically significant, exception made for the variable  GRO IND − , which is 
statistically significant and has a positive sign (confirming that it will be more 
appropriate to consider the variable  GRO IND −  as a proxy for the financial reporting 
costs rather than for impairment motive). 
However, all the proxies for the financial reporting costs and for the agency relationship 
have the same impact on the probability and on the propensity to account investment 
write-offs, exception made for the profitability and for the current ratio, which is not yet 
statistically significant. 
7  Concluding remarks 
This paper provides evidence that managers manipulate earnings in order to reduce the 
corporate tax burden. Tax deductibility is the one of the most important factors which 
affects the probability of discretionary write-offs of equity investments. A mean level a 
unit increase in the marginal tax rate raises the probability of write-offs by about 7%-
4%. The empirical analysis also confirms that tax minimization is limited by several 
non tax-costs. Write-offs of equity investments bring about a reduction of taxable 
income, a worse firm's performance, a worse firm's reputation and higher costs of 
borrowing. Opposite, the effect of the fiscal variable on the propensity to account 
investment write-offs results not statistically significant. 26 
 
The results of this paper raise several interesting issues which will be scrutinized in 
future research. One is related to the effect of the abolition of tax deductibility on the 
average effective tax burden of Italian companies. Further, there is the question of 
whether financial account manipulation interacts with other business decisions such as 
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APPENDIX 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for all Variables 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
WO 0.1488  0.3559  0  1 
WOTA 0.0021  0.0125  0  0.5586 
MTR 0.3056  0.0972  0  0.37 
TID 0.2924  0.1324  0  0.37 
MTR-PRE 0.2139  0.1684  0 0.37 
MTR-POST 0.0916  0.1425 0  0.33 
TID-PRE 0.2036  0.1796  0  0.37 
TID-POST 0.0887  0.1463  0  0.33 
AZIO 0.0415  0.2241  -1.709  0.7696 
IND_GROWTH .0608  0.1050 -6.9625  0.5934 
LGDP 10.7002  1.0369  7.5402  12.3840 
LEV 0.6734  0.1982  0  1 
LEVW 0.0267  0.0574  0  0.9020 
PROF 0.1212  3.740  -40.333  476.2 
ZSC 1.737  1.096  -23.932  44.3608 
ZSCW 0.0526  0.1162  -0.7029  2.7258 
CR 0.0100  0.1905  0  31.4395 
TA 0.1851  0.1619  0  0.99856 
SIZE 9.779  1.160  1.098  15.6796 
SPC 0.2372  0.4254  0  1 
SPE 0.3313  0.4706  0  1 
 
WO  is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has recorded investment write-offs. WOTA is the ratio 
between investment write-offs and total assets of the previous year. MTR is the fiscal variable 
constructed using Graham’s methodology. TID is the fiscal variable constructed using the value of 
income before taxes and investment write-offs and the top statutory rate.  AZIO  is the growth rate of the 
MIB index for all the firms in the same sector.  GROWTH IND_  is the industry average sales growth. 
LGDP  is the industry log of GDP. LEV  is the debt ratio and LEVW  is the debt ratio weighted 
according to the ratio total participations and total assets. PROF is the profitability measured with 
ROA. ZSC  is the modified Altman’s (1986) Z-Score. ZSCW  is the Z-score weighted according to the 
ratio total participations and total assets. CR  is the current ratio. TA  is the value of tangible assets with 
respect to total assets. SIZE is the natural log of sales. SPC  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firms are 
small private ones. PFC  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firms has participations in foreign firms.  
The full sample is composed by 5924 firms and has 53.316 observations from 1998 to 2006. 30 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for ATECO sectors 
ATECO 2002 SECTORS  Mean 
WOTA  Mean MTR  Mean TID  Obs  Share in 
Sample 
ORE-MINING  .0017458 0.316558  0.3172223  288  0.54 
MANUFACTURING 
ACTIVITY          
Food Industries  .0012907 0.313556  0.2820518  3051  5.72 
Textile Industries  .002713 0.293015  0.2704296  2817  5.28 
Tannery Industries  .0011539 0.30711  0.2758897  1287  2.41 
Wood Industries  .0014675 0.327999  0.3011934  486  0.91 
Paper Industries, Printing 
and Publishing  .0036304 0.292544  0.2831986  1485  2.78 
Production of  coke, oil 
refinery  .0011721 0.322123  0.3212821  135  0.22 
Production of chimical  .0031663 0.305106  0.2935664  1845  3.46 
Production of non metal-
bearing nugget  .0020253 0.319946  0.2982451  1926  3.61 
Metallurgy  .0012475 0.315723  0.2962537  1017  1.91 
Production of metal 
(excluding cars and plant)  .0015957 0.319238  0.3010747  3294  6.18 
Production of cars and 
mechanic  machine  .0025042 0.310261  0.299576  3609  6.77 
Production of electric, 
electronic and optical  
machine 
.0029418 0.310406  0.2990359  2178  4.08 
Production of transports  .0026568 0.293177  0.2787902  810  1.52 
Other manufacturing 




AND GAS  
.0016904 0.298616  0.3123809  252  0.47 
BUILDING  .0021993 0.309817  0.306588  4194  7.87 
COMMERCE AND 
REPARATIONS  .0012517 0.313017  0.2924484  14328  26.87 
HOTELS AND 




.0019825 0.278518  0.2851962  2727  5.11 
FINANCIAL ACTIVITY  .0084378 0.205101  0.3048643  405  0.76 
REAL ESTATE, HIRE 
AND IT ACTIITY  .0039661 0.288347  0.2945168  3456  6.48 
CIVIL SERVICES  .0012432 0.268455  0.3511111 9  0.02 
INSTRUCTION  .0000148 0.286054  0.3388889  27  0.05 
SANITATION AND 
SOCIAL WORK  .0031482 0.300464  0.3084388  711  1.33 
OTHER PUBLIC, 
WELFARE AND SOCIAL 
SERVICES 
.0029288 0.263493  0.2758574  729  1.37 




Table 3: Cross-correlation. Years 1998-2006 (53.325 observations) 
 MTR-PRE  MTR-POST  TID-PRE  TID-POST  AZIO  IND_GR
O 
LGDP LEV  LEVW 
MTR-PRE  1.000             
MTR-POST  -0.817  1.000            
TID-PRE  0.825  -0.728  1.000          
TID-POST  -0.770  -0.728  -0.687  1.000        
AZIO  -0.259 0.275  -0.233  0.262  1.000        
IND-GRO 0.002 0.012  0.001  0.010  0.100  1.000       
LGDP -0.018  0.007  -0.005  0.017  0.038  0.076  1.000     
LEV 0.106  -0.043  0.003  -0.086  -0.021  0.057  0.164  1.000   
LEVW -0.074  0.016  -0.038  0.036  0.016  -0.013  0.011  0.001  1.000 
PROF 0.011  -0.001  0.010  -0.001  -0.004  -0.004  0.001  -0.008  -0.007 
ZSC 0.128  -0.005  0.114  -0.008  -0.050  0.038  0.199  0.008  -0.230 
ZSCW -0.029  0.040  -0.001  0.051  -0.004  0.002  0.007  -0.147  0.542 
CR -0.019  -0.001  -0.001  0.006  -0.004  -0.003  0.008  -0.064  0.022 
TA 0.015  -0.039  -0.011  -0.050  -0.015  0.005  -0.151  -0.200  -0.075 
SIZE -0.080  0.117  -0.071  0.107  -0.049  -0.035  -0.057  0.022  0.035 
SPC 0.068  -0.078  0.054  -0.074  -0.011  0.037  0.162  0.079  -0.021 
PFC 0.006  0.006  0.023  0.018  0.042  -0.029  -0.135  -0.059  0.160 
 
 PROF  ZSC  ZSCP  CR  TA  SIZE  SPC  PFC 
PROF 1.000               
ZSC 0.022  1.000             
ZSCW -0.003  0.107  1.000           
CR -0.001  -0.036  0.005  1.000         
TA -0.002  -0.272  -0.095  -0.016  1.000       
SIZE -0.091  0.118  0.143  -0.019  -0.061  1.000     
SPC -0.003  0.176  -0.036  0.001  -0.066  -0.412  1.000   
PFC -0.003  -0.132  0.103  0.021  -0.053  0.214  -0.174  1.000 
 
 
Table 4: Cross-correlation between yearly MTR. Years 1998-2006 (53.325 observations) 
  MTR2000  MTR2000  MTR2000  MTR2001  MTR2002  MTR2003  MTR2004  MTR2005  MTR2006 
MTR1998  1.000           
MTR1999  -0.1172  1.000          
MTR2000  -0.1166  -0.1160  1.000         
MTR2001 -0.1163  -0.1157  -0.1151  1.000           
MTR2002 -0.1154  -0.1148  -0.1143  -0.1140  1.000         
MTR2003  -0.1145 -0.1139 -0.1133 -0.1130 -0.1122  1.000       
MTR2004  -0.1141 -0.1135 -0.1130 -0.1127 -0.1118 -0.1109  1.000     
MTR2005  -0.1128 -0.1122 -0.1116 -0.1113 -0.1105 -0.1096 -0.1092  1.000   




APPENDIX 2: Estimation Results 
 
Table 5: Determinants of the Investment Write-offs decision  
A  A.1  B  B.1 
   Expected 
Sign  (Probit RE Model)  (Marginal Effects)  (Logit RE Model)   (Marginal Effects) 
Fiscal Variables 
0.4274*** 0.0469*** 0.8695*** 0.0440***  MTR-PRE + 
(0.1111) (0.0122) (0.2025) (0.0103) 
-0.4623*** -0.0507***  -0.7805**  -0.0395** 
MTR-POST N.S.S. 
(0.1296) (0.0143) (0.2360) (0.0120) 
Impairment motive 
0.0244 0  .0027 0.0353 0.0018  AZIO - 
(0.0405) (0.0044) (0.0727) (0.0036) 
0.2078** 0.0228** 0.3954** 0.0200**  IND-GRO ? 
(0.0907) (0.0099) (0.1619) (0.0082) 
0.0672*** 0.0073*** 0.1246*** 0.0063*** 
LGDP   ? 
(0.0167) (0.0018) (0.0307) (0.0015) 
Financial Reporting Costs 
-0.5194*** -0.0569*** -0.9772***   -0.0494***  LEV - 
(0.0730) (0.0081) (0.1333) (0.0069) 
1.6896*** 0.1853*** 2.8385*** 0.1436***  LEVW ? 
(0.2190) (0.0247) (0.3980) (0.0206) 
0.0054* 0.0006* 0.0101* 0.0005*  PROF + 
(0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0055) (0.0002) 
-0.2803*** -0.0307*** -0.5509*** -0.0279***  ZSC + 
(0.0159) (0.0019) (0.0321) (0.0018) 
0.8036*** 0.0881*** 1.4728*** 0.0745***  ZSCW + 
(0.1080) (0.0120) (0.1965) (0.0101) 
0.2046*** 0.0224***  0.3441**  0.0174**  CR + 
(0.0629) (0.0069) (0.1129) (0.0057) 
-0.5411*** -0.0593*** -1.0402*** -0.0526***  TA + 
(0.0919) (0.0102) (0.1690) (0.0086) 
0.2728*** 0.0299*** 0.5016*** 0.0254*** 
SIZE + 
(0.0132) (0.0016) (0.0246) (0.0014) 
Agency Relationship 
-0.0068 -0.0007 -0.0088 -0.0004  SPC + 
(0.0363) (0.0039) (0.0671) (0.0033) 
0.5188*** 0.0662*** 0.9377*** 0.0558*** 
PFC + 
(0.0362) (0.0054) (0.0663) (0.0047) 
***,**,* : significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively (Standard Errors in parentheses) 
Results obtained using as fiscal variable MTR (Marginal Tax Rate constructed using Graham’s methodology). MTR-PRE is equal to 
MTR from 1998 to 2003 and is equal to zero from 2004 to 2006; MTR-POST is equal to zero up to 2003 and is equal to MTR from 
2004 to 2006. In the column A and in the column B there are respectively the estimated coefficients from the probit and logit 
random effects model. Instead, in the column A.1 and in the column B.1 there are the marginal effects. 
5924 firms; 53.316 observations;  1998-2006;  source: AIDA, BANCA D’ITALIA, ISTAT.  
All  data are measured in millions  of euros. 
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Table 6: Estimation results. Estimated  coefficients: yearly MTR     
A A.1 B B.1 
   Expected 
Sign  (Probit RE 
Model)  (Marginal Effects)  (Logit RE 
Model)   (Marginal Effects) 
0.3724** 0.0407** 0.7374** 0.0371**  MTR1998 + 
(0.1302) (0.0142) (0.2382) (0.0120) 
0.4543*** 0.0496*** 0.9179*** 0.0462***  MTR1999 + 
(0.1294) (0.0142) (0.2354) (0.0119) 
0.4399** 0.0481**  0.9111***  0.0458***  MTR2000 + 
(0.1299) (0.0142) (0.2358) (0.0119) 
0.5856*** 0.0640*** 1.1743*** 0.0591***  MTR2001 + 
(0.1373) (0.0150) (0.2483) (0.0125) 
0.2829** 0.0309** 0.6064** 0.0305**  MTR2002 + 
(0.1369) (0.0149) (0.2482) (0.0125) 
0.5304*** 0.0580*** 1.0524*** 0.0530***  MTR2003 + 
(0.1388) (0.0152) (0.2512) (0.0127) 
-0.1164 -0.0127 -0.1295 -0.0065  MTR2004 N.S.S. 
(0.1479) (0.0161) (0.2683) (0.0135) 
-0.4736** -0.0518** -0.7727** -0.0389**  MTR2005 N.S.S. 
(0.1501) (0.0165) (0.2731) (0.0138) 
-0.8057*** -0.0881*** -1.4768*** -0.0743*** 
MTR2006 N.S.S 
(0.1519) (0.0168) (0.2786) (0.0142) 
***,**,* : significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively (Standard Errors in parentheses) 
 
Results obtained using as fiscal variable yearly MTR.  
In the column A and in the column B there are respectively the estimated coefficients from the probit and logit random effects 
model. In the column A.1 and in the column B.1 there are the marginal effects. 
5924 firms; 53.316 observations;  1998-2006;  source: AIDA, BANCA D’ITALIA, ISTAT.  






















Table 7: Robustness I  
A B  C 
   Expected 
Sign  (Yearly TID)  (Small Private Companies)  (Manifacturing Activity) 
Fiscal Variables 
   0.0274**  0.0678***  MTR-PRE + 
 (0.0132) (0.0178) 
 -0.0095  -0.0417** 
MTR-POST N.S.S. 
   (0.0158)  (0.0205) 
0.0794***     TID-PRE + 
(0.0086)    
-0.0125    
TID-POST N.S.S. 
(0.0102)       
Impairment motive 
- 0  .0027  0.0063  0.0009  AZIO 
  (0.0044) (0.0045)  (0.0058) 
? 0.0213**  0.0272**  0.0120  IND-GRO 
  (0.0099) (0.0107)  (0.0178) 
?   0.0073***  0.0027  -0.0089 
LGDP 
   (0.0018) (0.0017)  (0.0054) 
Financial Reporting Costs 
-0.0519*** -0.0370***  -0.0575***  LEV - 
(0.0081) (0.0086)  (0.0120) 
0.1838*** 0.0853***  0.2530***  LEVW ? 
(0.0247) (0.0218)  (0.0407) 
0.0006* 0.0005  0.0008  PROF + 
(0.0003) (0.0006)  (0.0013) 
-0.0316*** -0.0133***  -0.0387***  ZSC + 
(0.0019) (0.0017)  (0.0038) 
0.0881*** 0.0431***  0.0426**  ZSCW + 
(0.0120) (0.0107)  (0.0195) 
0.0221** 0.0269**  0.0401**  CR + 
(0.0069) (0.0096)  (0.0154) 
-0.0569*** -0.0345**    -0.0668***  TA + 
(0.0101) (0.0100)  (0.0163) 
0.0299*** 0.0067**  0.0398*** 
SIZE + 
(0.0016) (0.0019)  (0.0027) 
Agency Relationship 
-0.0001   0.0091  SPC + 
(0.0039)   (0.0072) 
0.0652*** 0.0229**  0.0591*** 
PFC + 
(0.0054) (0.0069)  (0.0065) 
***,**,* : significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively (Standard Errors in parentheses) 
Marginal effects estimated using a probit model: 
1) we use as fiscal variable TID, which is equal to statutory tax rate for firms with positive income pre-taxes and pre-write-offs of 
equity investment, zero otherwise.  TID-PRE is equal to TID from 1998 to 2003 and is equal to zero from 2004 to 2006; TID-POST 
is equal to zero up to 2003 and is equal to TID from 2004 to 2006 (53.316 observations, 5924 firms); 
2) the sample is restricted to small private companies (12.650 observations, 1927 firms); 




Table 8: Robustness II  
D E  F 
   Expected 
Sign  (Ateco Sectors)  (PFC=0)  (no listed companies) 
Fiscal Variables 
0.0466*** 0.0299**  0.0449***  MTR-PRE + 
(0.0121) (0.0098)  (0.0119) 
 -0.0494**  -0.0251**  -0.0417** 
MTR-POST N.S.S. 
(0.0142) (0.0116)  (0.0139) 
Impairment motive 
0.0049 0.0063*  0.0033  AZIO - 
(0.0048) (0.0038)  (0.0043) 
0.0240** 0.0221**  0.0258**  IND-GRO ? 
(0.0106) (0.0084)  (0.0098) 
0.0079*** 0.0042**  0.0065*** 
LGDP ? 
(0.0019) (0.0014)  (0.0018) 
Financial Reporting Costs 
-0.0521*** -0.0292***  -0.0452***  LEV - 
(0.0082) (0.0067)  (0.0080) 
0.1728*** 0.1117***  0.1834***  LEVW ? 
(0.0256) (0.0219)  (0.0246) 
0.0006* 0.0001  0.0005*  PROF + 
(0.0003) (0.0009)  (0.0003) 
-0.0292*** -0.0183***  -0.0284***  ZSC + 
(0.0019) (0.0016)  (0.0018) 
0.0855*** 0.0659***  0.0825***  ZSCW + 
(0.0122) (0.0100)  (0.0119) 
0.0195** 0.0214**  0.0380***  CR + 
(0.0073) (0.0071)  (0.0102) 
-0.0565*** -0.0275**  -0.0515***  TA + 
(0.0104) (0.0080)  (0.0099) 
 0.0296***  0.0155***  0.0279*** 
SIZE + 
(0.0017) (0.0014)  (0.0016) 
Agency Relationship 
-0.0011 -0.0009  -0.0004  SPC + 
(0.0039) (0.0029)  (0.0038) 
0.0646***   0.0621*** 
PFC + 
(0.0054)   (0.0053) 
***,**,* : significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively (Standard Errors in 
parentheses) 
 
Marginal effects estimated using a probit model: 
•  (D) Sample restricted to firms in ATECO sectors with more than 79 firms (51.363 observations, 5707 firms); 
•  (E) Sample restricted to firms with no foreign participations  (35.649 observations, 3961 firms); 
•  (F) Sample restricted to no listed companies (52.560 observations, 5.840 firms). 36 
 
 
Table 9: Regression with Interaction Terms  
   Expected Sign  Coefficients  Marginal Effects 
Fiscal Variables 
MTR-PRE  +  1.3324** (0.6092) 0.1459** (0.0668) 
MTR-POST N.S.S.  -0.4986***  (0.1327) -0.0546*** (0.0146) 
Impairment motive 
AZIO  -  0.0311 (0.0871) 0.0034 (0.0095) 
IND-GRO  ?  -0.0483 (0.1972) -0.0052 (0.0216) 
LGDP  ?  0.0763*** (0.0199) 0.0083*** (0.0021) 
Financial Reporting Costs 
LEV  -  -0.4311*** (0.0913) -0.0472*** (0.0101) 
LEVW  ?  1.3202*** (0.2798) 0.1446*** (0.0310) 
PROF  +  0.0019 (0.0253) 0.0002 (0.0027) 
ZSC  +  -0.2475*** (0.0212) -0.0271*** (0.0024) 
ZSCW  +  0.6324*** (0.1483) 0.0692*** (0.0163) 
CR  +  0.1671** (0.0728) 0.0183** (0.0079) 
TA  +  -0.4356*** (0.1186) -0.0477*** (0.0130) 
SIZE  +  0.2695*** (0.0133) 0.0295*** (0.0016) 
Agency Relationship 
SPC  +  0.0056 (0.0509) 0.0006 (0.0056) 
PFC  +  0.5340*** (0.0438) 0.0683*** (0.0065) 
Interaction Terms 
MTR-PRE*AZIO  ?  0.0007 (0.2882) 0.0001 (0.0315) 
MTR-PRE*IND-GRO +  0.9616 (0.6539) 0.1053 (0.0717) 
MTR-PRE*LGDP  +  -0.0405 (0.0532)   -0.0044 (0.0058) 
MTR-PRE*LEV  ?  -0.5056* (0.2904) -0.0554* (0.0318) 
MTR-PRE*LEVW  ?  2.3347* (1.0925) 0.2558* (0.1199) 
MTR-PRE*PROF  +  0.0101 (0.0710) 0.0011 (0.0077) 
MTR-PRE*ZSC +  -0.1450**  (0.0687)    -0.0158**  (0.0075) 
MTR-PRE*ZSCW  +  0.5399 (0.5425) 0.0591 (0.0594) 
MTR-PRE*CR  +  0.5738 (0.4269) 0.0628 (0.0468) 
MTR-PRE*TA  +  -0.5647 (0.3710) -0.0618 (0.0406) 
MTR-PRE*SPC  +  -0.0294 (0.1497) -0.0032 (0.0164) 
MTR-PRE*PFC  +  -0.0458 (0.1107) -0.0050 (0.0121) 
***,**,* : significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively (Standard Errors in parentheses) 
 
 
Marginal effects estimated with a probit model, in which we use as fiscal variable MTR and insert the interaction terms between tax 
and non-tax costs. 
5924 firms; 53.316 observations;  1998-2006;  source: AIDA, BANCA D’ITALIA, ISTAT.  





Table 10: Determinants of the Magnitude of Investment Write-offs - Cragg Analysis  
   Expected Sign  Coefficients 
Fiscal Variables 






0.0023  AZIO - 
(0.0021) 





Financial Reporting Costs 
-0.0182***  LEV - 
(0.0031) 
0.1452***  LEVW ? 
(0.0165) 
0.0008***  PROF + 
(0.0001) 
-0.0091***  ZSC + 
(0.0014) 
0.0409***  ZSCW + 
(0.0081) 
0.0025  CR + 
(0.0018) 











***,**,* : significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively 
 (Robust Standard Errors in parentheses) 
 
Results from a Cragg  model, in which we analyze the determinants of the magnitude of investment write-offs, using as MTR  fiscal 
variable (Marginal Tax Rate constructed using Graham’s methodology). MTR-PRE is equal to MTR from 1998 to 2003 and is equal 
to zero from 2004 to 2006; MTR-POST is equal to zero up to 2003 and is equal to MTR from 2004 to 2006. 
5924 firms; 53.316 observations;  1998-2006;  source: AIDA, BANCA D’ITALIA, ISTAT.  
All  data are  measured in millions  of euros. 
 
 